Wilkinson on Klein

In a fashion similar to my post Krugman at His Most Partisan, Will Wilkinson takes Ezra Klein to task for flippantly dismissing the foundation of Republican disagreement. Within Krugman and Klein’s frame of thinking, people disagree for strictly partisan reasons rather than the more plausible, good-intentioned starting point of the other side thinks their policies work.

The more dangerous temptation is not to pretend an opposing view does not exist, but to treat it as beneath notice in respectable deliberation by assuming it is ignorant or prejudiced or self-interested or based on insufficient contemplation of moral reality. Such an attitude embodies the idea that since truth in matters of justice, right, or policy is singular and consensus is its natural embodiment, some special explanation — some factor of deliberative pathology, such as the lingering taint of self-interest — is required to explain disagreement, which explanation can then be cited as a reason for putting the deviant view to one side. – Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement

Whenever I have an informal debate, I make it very clear that it’s not the ends we disagree about (generally), it’s the process. No one has an a priori claim to the moral high ground.

The Self-Interested Voter Hypothesis doesn’t have the evidence behind it. The vast majority of people want to construct policy to do what’s best for the most amount of people. Therein lies 95% of political disagreement: what policy does the best to maximize the general welfare?

I say complete economic and political liberalization. You are free to disagree but don’t question my morals!