The Cato Institute’s Will Wilkinson is known for promoting a “liberal-tarian” alliance and hopes that a doctrine of limited government and humanitarian cosmopolitanism could prevail in future generations. I think he might be right, but only if people our age wake up to the fact that future resources that we could be buying awesome stuff with will instead be used to marginally prolong the lives of aging strangers. With regards to entitlement spending, the demographic situation is tilted heavily against young people, but I doubt that our generation will have an influence on any election for at least 20 years (2008 didn’t count–I predict a return to 2004 level turnout of young voters in the next Presidential election).
I digress. Wilkinson is also really good at portraying libertarianism in a hip liberal-sounding manner. For example, not long ago, he came out of the hot-boxed closet and admitted that he smokes pot… and likes it! He was also the most eloquent voice in the debacle that wasLibertarian Nostalgia Fest 2010. Today he has an especially insightful post exposing the philosophy of John Rawls as decidedly illiberal. Rawls’ veil of ignorance is often used to justify government intervention on behalf of the worst-off of members of society. However, his theory of justice hinges on an unrealistic assumption: a closed society.
Wilkinson writes:
David Schmidtz says theories are like maps; they help us get where we’re trying to go. John Rawls’ theory of justice assumes a closed society as a simplifying assumption. If theories are like maps, as Schmidtz says, a simplifying assumption in a theory is like leaving current patterns of traffic off a road map. But a theory of social justice for a closed society is like a map that says “Here there be monsters” where your pants were made and where the guys who built your house were born. That’s not simplifying. That’s more like a map that shows roads dead-ending where there are actually bridges. It’s not just wrong, it makes the map pretty well useless, especially if there are a lot of bridges. If your theory of justice gives you no way to make sense of the guys who built your house, or of what you and they might owe to each other, you need a better theory.
This is an excellent argument to bring up the next time someone in your Poli-Sci discussion invokes Rawls to argue for a larger social safety net, increased funding to public education or high-speed internet for all Americans.


Swedish Success